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WILL THE PLAYERS UNION TAKE AN L OR TAKE A 
KNEE?: THE FIRST AMENDMENT LEGAL ISSUES 




This Article analyzes the First Amendment issues present in the NFL 
National Anthem controversy. Part I introduces the state action doctrine and 
analyzes the various tests courts use to make a finding of state action within 
private organizations. Then, these tests are applied to the NFL through 
observing the roles of the United States military and the President and how 
their direct involvement may have created the appearance of state action 
within a private organization. Part II further builds on the state action claim, 
examining the role of employee compelled speech in a private organization 
following state action. Finally, Part III concludes with how these legal issues 
will affect the next round of collective bargaining in 2021. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
pre-season game in 2016, 
Anthem ceremony.1 While the rest of his teammates remained standing 
during the ceremony, Kaepernick and one other player, Eric Reid, kneeled to 
protest the police brutality against ethnic minorities within the United States.2 
attention by other players in the NFL, and they too began to kneel. This 
phenomenon sparked an enormous controversy o
Collective Bargaining Agreement makes no mention of the National Anthem, 
encourages players to stand during the 
National Anthem ceremony.3 This made it questionable as to whether the 
 status 
as a private organization, it seems as though the NFL was legally permitted 
to require that all its players refrain from kneeling and to require them to 
relationship with the government and other public institutions, the NFL might 
be hovering over the edge of state actor status, therefore placing it within the 
sphere of public functions subject to the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
These legal issues will certainly be at the very forefront of discussions as we 
approach negotiations for the new 2021 Collective Bargaining Agreement.  
A.  The State Action Doctrine and Why It Matters 
Under Section 1983 of the US Code, any person who acts on behalf of 
protected by the US Constitution is liable to the injured party in the form of 
a civil action.4 According to Section 1983, 
 
1 ESPN News Servs., Colin Kaepernick Protests Anthem over Treatment of Minorities, THE 
UNDEFEATED (Aug. 27, 2016), http://theundefeated.com/features/colin-kaepernick-protests-anthem-over-
treatment-of-minorities/. 
2 Id. 
3 Alex Fitzpatrick, Does the NFL Require Players to Stand for the National Anthem?, TIME (Sept. 
25, 2017), http://time.com/4955704/nfl-league-rulebook-a62-63-national-anthem-rume/. 
4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). 
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resort to any legal remedy against the NFL for infringement of their freedom 
of speech, the players must first assert that the NFL is a state actor or that it 
5 in depriving the players of their First 
Amendment rights protected by the US Constitution. This is essential to the 
, because only public institutions are subject to the regulations 
of the Constitution, as the Fourteenth Amendment has been held to apply to 
state action only. As a result, private actors do not face the same scrutiny in 
regard to a constitutional violation. While they may still face repercussions 
for their actions, they cannot be held liable for violating the US Constitution.  
B.  Private Actors and the State Action Doctrine 
This situation prompts a very interesting question: Are private actors 
permitted to freely violate the US Constitution? The answer to this question 
is: not necessarily, depending on the circumstances. The Supreme Court has 
been extremely hesitant to impose the US Constitution upon private actors; 
color of state 
Constitution.6 In one of the most articulate court opinions ever written, 
Justice Jackson in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette stated, 
7 The 
Supreme Court, almost forty years later, seemed to build upon this statement 
in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn 
attributable to the state on certain occasions when the private party acted in 
8 This seems to suggest that there are certain 
situations where a private actor may be subject to the restraints of the 
Constitution.  
Barnette highlighted the significance of protecting the rights and 
privileges guaranteed to US citizens by the US Constitution, and it involved 
the Board of Education in West Virginia, which adopted a resolution 
requiring students in public school to stand during the Pledge of Allegiance.9 
to their religious beliefs, the Board expelled these students, and the parents 
Amendment 
rights.10 The Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for the Board 
 
5 Id.  
6 Id. 
7 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
8 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 n.6 (1982). 
9 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625 27.  
10 Id. at 629. 
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11 
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or 
12 With this statement, the Court hoped to drive home 
the importance of protecting the very rights and privileges this nation was 
built to protect. 
The Supreme Court must meet a very high threshold to find that a private 
entity is acting under the color of law and subject it to constitutional 
liability.13 Nevertheless, the Court has considered several, yet rare, 
occurrences where a private actor is held to be acting under the color of state 
law and therefore liable under the US Constitution. The case of Lugar v. 
Edmondson Oil Co. lays out a two-step test for when a defendant is subject 
to Section 1983 liability.14 
caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a 
rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is 
th the deprivation must be 
15 The second part of the 
test has given courts a difficult time, because there is no clear line as to when 
a private actor becomes a state actor. The following factors have been 
adopted to attempt to answer this question and give the courts some guidance 
in determining whether a private actor should be held to the status of a state 
actor. Specifically, these factors are aimed towards preventing private 
organizations that mainta
depriving an individual of his rights and privileges secured by the US 
Constitution.16 
1.  Traditional and Exclusive Public Functions  
A private entity may be held to be acting under the color of law when it 
17 This test is extremely narrow, as the private organization must be 
performing a function that only the government traditionally performs, such 
 
11 Id. at 645.  
12 Id. at 642.  
13 HOWARD M. WASSERMAN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 26 27 (2d ed. 2018). 
14 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). 
15 Id.  
16 See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 26.  
17 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 849 (1982). 
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as running general and primary elections,18 or providing services for a 
private, company town.19 The Court in Marsh v. Alabama held that even 
though the town was funded and operated through a private company, the 
company did not have the authority to impose criminal punishment on a 
resident for distributing religious literature throughout the town.20 The Court 
Fourteenth Amendment rights despite its status as a private entity.21  
In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the 
premises where the deprivation of liberty, here involved, 
took place, were held by others than the public, is not 
govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their 
fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint 
by the application of a state statute.22  
This case presents a clear example of when the Court must attempt to 
balance the rights and liberties of citizens with the rights of a private entity. 
function of operating a fire department.23 The Fourth Circuit, relying on 
previous case law 
services had been the traditional and exclusive function of the state of 
Maryland.24 The court made clear that this finding was a fact-specific inquiry 
regarding only  and it did not rule on whether 
firefighting services in the abstract were considered traditional and exclusive 
functions of the state.25 Finally, the state can delegate its exclusive and 
traditional functions to private entities, which then places the private entity 
26 This was the case in Fabrikant v. French, 
where the Second Circuit held that the private Society for Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) was acting under the delegated authority of New 
York to seize and sterilize dogs.27 Thus, the SPCA was acting as a state actor 
 
18 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 462 63 (1953).  
19 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946).  
20 Id. at 509. 
21 Id. at 508 09.  
22 Id. at 509.  
23 Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2000).  
24 Id. at 344 45.  
25 Id. at 344.  
26 Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 210 (2d Cir. 2012).  
27 Id. at 210 11. 
402 Take an L or Take a Knee? [Vol. 14:397 
 
28 Instances where 
courts have not found a private organization to be performing exclusive and 
traditional government functions include managing hospitals and healthcare 
facilities,29 operating educational facilities,30 and regulating interscholastic 
athletics.31 As a result, only very few functions have been held to be exclusive 
and traditional government functions.  
2.  Symbiotic Relationship  
The symbiotic relationship test has been the broadest and most 
controversial application in which the Supreme Court has found a private 
entity to be acting under the color of law.32 This test derives from the case of 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.33 In Burton, a private restaurant had 
leased space in a public parking garage where it operated on a twenty-year 
lease.34 The restaurant refused to serve an African American customer, 
violating equal protection.35 The restaurant argued that because it was a 
private entity, it was not subject to the United States Constitution; however, 
the Court did not accept this argument as a compelling one.36 The Court 
parking garage in the variety of mutual benefits both retained.37 The 
restaurant had easily available access for its customers to park, and the 
parking garage benefited from the lease payments made by the restaurant.38 
Further, the restaurant did not want to serve African Americans because it 
made more money catering to whites only, and because the public parking 
money, it was indirectly benefiting from the 
private discrimination against African Americans.39 This joint relationship 
the color of law, and therefore subject to the US Constitution.40 It is unclear 
 
28 Id.  
29 McGugan v. Aldana-Bernier, 752 F.3d 224, 230 31 (2d Cir. 2014).  
30 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 43 (1982). 
31  
32 See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 29.  
33 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961).  
34 Id. at 719.  
35 Id. at 720.  
36 Id. at 723 25.  
37 Id. at 724.  
38 Id. 
39 See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 29.  
40 Burton, 365 U.S. at 726. 
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how persuasive the symbiotic relationship test is, as the Court has only relied 
on it in Burton and not in any later cases dealing with private entities and 
state action.41 
However, the Third Circuit has found a symbiotic relationship between 
the state and two private universities when the state legislature specifically 
serve as a State-related institution in the Commonwealth System of higher 
ate statute.42 While the court discussed the financial 
relationship between the universities and the state, it held that this alone was 
not enough to find a symbiotic relationship present.43 There must be more 
than just a financial relationship in existence. The Third Circuit also focused 
determination and that the funds must be kept in a certain account.44 The 
statute creates a tax exemption for the universities, allows for the State to 
choose one-
file annual reports of university activities.45 As a result, the private 
universities had an interdependent, symbiotic relationship with the state.46 In 
addition, the New York Southern District applied the symbiotic relationship 
test to find state action present between the MLB and the state of New York 
for purposes of striking down an MLB rule prohibiting female reporters from 
entering the Stadium clubhouses.47 The court focused on the similarities 
between this case and Burton, highlighting the fact that the city of New York 
and the Yankees shared a mutually beneficial relationship.48 The court relied 
on a five prong test to make its finding of state action. The test examines:  
governmental aid; (2) the extent and intrusiveness of 
governmental regulation involved; (3) whether or not aid is 
given to all similar institutions or is suggestive of 
particular case; (4) whether or not the institution under attack 
performs a public function; and (5) the legitimacy of the 
 
41 See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 30. 
42 Krynicky v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 102 (3d Cir. 1984). 
43 Id. at 101.  
44 Id. at 102.  
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 103. 
47 Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F.Supp. 86, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).  
48 Id. at 93.  
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private in character, 
in associational or constitutional terms.49 
The court noted that this was a guiding principle, and the absence of one 
prong did not automatically render state action inapplicable.50 The Yankees 
are financially dependent on the City and its publicly funded stadium, while 
the City benefits economically from the sale of tickets and fans attending 
games.51 
including ticket prices and stadium rules.52 For the fifth prong, the appellate 
court balanced the interests of the private entity remaining private against the 
harm to the public from the alleged offensive conduct.53 Because the claim 
here was sex discrimination, the fifth prong was clearly met, and the court 
made a finding of state action.54 
3.  Close Nexus 
Another test courts can apply to find a private actor acting under the 
color of law is to look for a close 
and the government.55 The finding of a close nexus is also very limited, as 
actions.56 The Ninth Circuit held that a close nexus was present in Chudacoff 
v. University Medical Center, when private physicians were performing their 
duties as part of a state-mandated medical program.57 such a close 
nexus between the State and the challenged action that the  
conduct may be fairly 58 Despite the fact 
that the doctors were privately employed, the University Medical Center 
received its authority to regulate the physicians through state law, and 
action.59 Further, a close 
such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must 
 
49 Id. at 95.  
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 96.  
55 See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 30.  
56 Id. 
57 Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011).  
58 Id. 
295 96 (2001)).  
59 Id.  
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60 The Second Circuit applied this 
principle in United States v. Stein
enforcement of a policy that stopped advancing legal fees to defendants was 
state action.61 The court reasoned that because the state gave off the 
policy.62 The accounting firm had no choice except to comply with the 
government further reinforced compliance through its emphasis that 
misconduct could not be rewarded under the federal guidelines.63 Because 
the fee policy was the subject of the complaint, the state must be liable for its 
effects.64  
The Supreme Court has only applied the close nexus test in one case
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.65 The plaintiff in Moose Lodge sued a private 
club under Section 1983 for denying him service based on racial 
discrimination.66 The club claimed that it was a private entity and not subject 
to Section 1983; however, the Court held that because the state liquor board 
issued the club a license that permitted it to sell alcohol, the club was a state 
actor for purposes of Section 1983.67 
forbidden discrimination need not originate with the State if it is state action 
68 The ideology behind the 
close nexus theory is that if the government delegates authority to a private 
entity and the private entity practices unconstitutional regulations, the 
government then becomes a supporter of the harmful, private conduct.69 As 
become public functions, which subjects the private organization to 
constitutional regulation.70  
 
60 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).  
61 United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008).  
62 Id. at 148.  
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 147.  
65 See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 31. 
66 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 165 (1972).  
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 172.  
69 See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 31. 
70 Id.  
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4.  Entwinement  
e entity 
acting under the color of state law was in 2001 in Brentwood Academy v. 
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass n.71 In this case, the Tennessee 
Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA), a not-for-profit 
corporation, regulated sports programs between private and public high 
schools within the state of Tennessee.72 When the TSSAA concluded that 
Brentwood Academy had violated a recruiting rule through undue influence 
program on probation for four years, prohibiting the football and basketball 
teams from competing for two years, and imposing a $3,000 fine.73 
Brentwood filed suit against the TSSAA under Section 1983, claiming that 
the TSSAA was a state actor and subject to the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.74 
regulator of interscholastic athletics, along with the Board of Education who 
but the TSSAA still played a regulatory function.75 However, because of this 
between the TSSAA and the state too difficult to draw.76 Because the TSSAA 
had only changed its title but continued to do the same work, the Court found 
that there was still active state involvement.77 Instead, the Court stated that 
nominally private character of the Association is overborne by the 
pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its 
1983.78 The Court in essence established an entwinement test for determining 
when private entities are acting under the color of law. Entwinement is a very 
similar concept to close nexus, but the crux of entwinement lies in the 
, whereas close nexus 
s conduct 
rather than the organization itself.79  
 
71 Id. at 32. 
72  
73 Id. at 293.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 301.  
76 See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 32. 
77 Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 301. 
78 Id. at 298.  
79 See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 33. 
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Because entwinement is a relatively recent test, not many cases have 
relied on it. However, the Middle District of Tennessee relied on this doctrine 
to find that a private bus company (DTO) that supplied drivers to a public 
transport service (MTA) had created an appearance of entwinement.80 In the 
past, MTA had selected the employees for its own system.81 However, once 
MTA delegated the power to appoint employees to DTO, DTO was 
ate with powers . . 82 Moreover, 
the plaintiff also alleged that certain individuals who managed and controlled 
83 
As a result, the plaintiff alleged enough evidence to dispute issues of fact as 
to whether DTO and MTA are sufficiently entwined for purposes of 
liability.84  
Overall, the Supreme Court has been very cautious in applying any of 
these tests to a case dealing with private organizations and constitutional 
constitutional rights with the reach of federal laws, these tests are not likely 
under Section 1983 and the First Amendment. Nevertheless, there is an 
argument to be made that the NFL is acting under the color of state law, 
placing it within the sphere of constitutional limitations.  
C.  Is the NFL Acting Under the Color of State Law? 
The National Football League (NFL) is a private, professional football 
organization founded in the United States and is made up of thirty-two 
teams.85 The NFL is divided into two divisions the National Football 
Conference (NFC) and the American Football Conference (AFC).86 Because 
the organization is private in nature, it is not subject to many of the 
constitutional limitations that are placed on public institutions. However, the 
NFL does engage in business with several public entities. The question now 
becomes: Exactly how much of 
federal or state governments? Is this enough to hold the NFL as acting under 
 
80 Thompson v. Davidson Transit Org., 563 F. Supp. 2d 820, 828 (M.D. Tenn. 2008).  
81 Id. at 827.  
82 Id.  
83 Id. at 827 28.  
84 Id. at 828.  
85 National Football League, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA (2020), 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Football-League.  
86 Id.  
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relationships with the federal government and state governments.  
1.   
The most important and relevant relationship that the NFL currently has 
with a government entity is its contract with the United States military. The 
main argument here is that the NFL could be acting under the color of state 
law from its long historical relationship with the United States military, 
culminating into a contract of millions of dollars a year to conduct pre-game 
ceremonies including flyovers, military returns, and the National Anthem.87 
This r
Pete Rozelle, a World War II Navy veteran, paved the way for the support of 
NFL patriotism.88 
lism.89 The 1968 Super Bowl featured 
Department of Defense.90 The NFL pounced on this newly formed 
relationship and began sending players on United Service Organization tours 
abroad as a sign of appreciation to the military men and women.91 The 1980s 
and 1990s brought closer ties between the NFL and United States military; 
the winter version of the Fourth of J 92 If this was not enough 
to show the close bond between the two entities, the tragic events on 
September 11, 2001, further strengthened this inseparable bond between the 
NFL and United States military.93 The NFL began engaging in more charity 
work for the United States military through raising money for veteran 
programs, conducting military tributes, and displaying camouflage uniforms 
during games.94 However, throughout the years, the players were never 
required to participate in any of these ceremonies or even stand on the field 
 
87 Melanie Schmitz, How the NFL Sold Patriotism to the US Military for Millions, 
THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 25, 2017, 2:19 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/nfl-dod-national-anthem-
6f682cebc7cd/.  
88 Adam Kilgore, For Decades, the NFL Wrapped Itself in 
Uneasy, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2018, 11:23 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/for-decades-
the-nfl-wrapped-itself-in-the-flag-now-thats-made-business-uneasy/2018/09/06/bc9aab64-b05d-11e8-
9a6a-565d92a3585d_story.html?utm_term=.d07e6dd217bb. 
89 Id.  
90 Id. 
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during the National Anthem; they sat in the locker rooms instead.95 The 
players began to take the field in 2009 when the NFL signed a formal contract 
with the United States Department of Defense in which the NFL would 
exhibit signs of patriotism in exchange for millions of dollars from the 
Department of Defense.96 This tactic was seen as a marketing strategy for the 
United States military, whose goal was to appeal to a wider audience in order 
to recruit more enlistees.97 From 2011 to 2014, the Department of Defense 
paid the NFL $5.4 million to conduct patriotic ceremonies for recruiting 
measures.98 In addition, from 2013 to 2015 the National Guard also paid the 
NFL $6.7 million for similar ceremonies.99 Is this long-standing relationship 
a private organization, for purposes of establishing state action? 
2.  
Involvement with the NFL 
military, President Trump has become actively involved in the 
National Anthem issue and has spoken out about his disagreement with the 
100 Some of his comments, many of which are found on 
Twitter, include actions that the NFL should take in punishing the players for 
kneeling during the National 
disrespecting our Flag & Country, you will see change take place fast. Fire 
101 President Trump has openly sided with those who believe the 
players should stand during the National Anthem as a sign of respect for the 
flag. His comments and posts have suggested that NFL owners should fire or 




97 Id.  
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 See Brooke Singman, , 
N.Y. POST (May 30, 2018, 5:20 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/05/30/how-trump-pushed-nfl-into-new-
anthem-rule-this-one-lifts-me/. 
101 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 24, 2017, 3:44 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/911904261553950720?lang=en. 
102 Id.; see also Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (SEPT. 23, 2017, 11:11 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/911654184918880260?lang=en ( If a player wants the 
privilege of making millions of dollars in the NFL, or other leagues, he or she should not be allowed to 
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expressed his views over this issue at a rally held in Alabama.103 He posed 
this jarring question to the audience: 
NFL owners when somebody disrespects our flag to say get that son of a bitch 
 104 These comments present 
an interesting situation amongst all the controversy because, on the one hand, 
the President may be giving his own opinion on the issue, which he is 
permitted to do. However, on the other hand, he is speaking to the entire 
nation when he addresses this issue in his presidential capacity. Another 
example takes a step further beyond his mere opinion on the issue and instead 
leave stadium if any players kneeled, disrespecting our country. I am proud 
105 This tweet came after many people 
criticized and praised Vice President Pence after he and his wife left an 
Indianapolis Colts game where several players decided to kneel during the 
National Anthem.106 While the previous examples seemed to express an 
opinion, this was more. President Trump explicitly asked that Vice President 
Pence leave if the players kneeled; this was a direct request made in his 
capacity as President. Actions and words made by the President of the United 
States certainly constitute that of a state actor, and because they are made in 
an official capacity, President Trump is slowly injecting his power and 
authority of a public office into a private organization. If requesting Vice 
President Pence might not be enough to implicate state action, maybe the 
meets this threshold.107 
the NFL National Anthem issue have added to the chaotic mess of public 
versus private for purposes of First Amendment violations. If the President 
enough to make a finding of state action, what would the claim of state action 
 
disrespect . . . our Great American Flag (or Country) and should stand for the National Anthem. If not, 
 
103 Ian Schwartz, 




105 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2017, 11:16 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/917091286607433728?lang=en. 
106 Kevin Seifert, Mike Pence Leaves 49ers-Colts Game over Protesting During National Anthem, 
ESPN (Oct. 9, 2017), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/20955550/mike-pence-leaves-san-francisco-
49ers-indianapolis-colts-game-protesting-national-anthem. 
107 Peter Baker & Ken Belson, Trump Threatens N.F.L. and Attacks Jemele Hill of ESPN, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/us/politics/trump-nfl-jemele-hill.html.  
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look like? Would all of the tests lead to a conclusion of state action for the 
NFL?  
D.  The NFL and Joint-Participation  
Of the four tests previously discussed and used by courts to find a private 
actor liable under the United States Constitution, the most compelling one to 
apply to the NFL is the symbiotic relationship test. Because the symbiotic 
actor as engaging in state action, this likely would be the best opportunity to 
subject the NFL to the restrictions of the First Amendment and the 
Constitution.108 Similar to the public parking garage and private restaurant in 
Burton
military where both entities benefit.109 The NFL helps advertise the United 
States military by conducting all of its pre-game ceremonies including 
flyovers, tributes, and the National Anthem. The United States military in 
turn pays the NFL millions of dollars for these signs of patriotism. In 
addition, just as the public garage in Burton indirectly benefited from the 
-Americans, the United States military 
also benefits from the NFL in its refusal to permit its players to protest during 
the National Anthem.110  
A more compelling argument for a symbiotic relationship between the 
NFL and United States government lies in the Southern District of New 
 Ludtke.111 -prong test to determine 
state action, the NFL meets several of the five factors. First, the NFL depends 
on the government for financial support, through its contracts with the United 
States military and through public funding for numerous stadiums. The 
ear. Second, 
advertising must be carried out (flyovers, National Anthem ceremony, etc.), 
when it is to be conducted, and what to cover in the advertising. Third, 
financial aid appears to be provided to similar institutions, like the NBA and 
MLB;112 however, this does not prevent a showing of state action. Fourth, the 
 
108 See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 29. 
109 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961). 
110 See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 29. 
111 Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F.Supp. 86, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).  
112 See Dave Hogg, The Military Paid Pro Sports Teams $10.4 Million for Patriotic Displays, 
Troop Tributes, SBNATION (Nov. 4, 2015, 4:11 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/2015/11/4/9670302/nfl-
paid-patriotism-troops-mcain-flake-report-
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NFL performs public functions in hosting football games, which are open to 
the public to attend. Lastly, the legitima
must be weighed against the potential harm to the public in offensive 
conduct.113 In this case, the courts should certainly focus on this last prong. 
The potential harm to the public in not permitting the players to advocate 
social justice matters is very high. The players occupy special positions in 
society due to their status that allows them to use their platform for change. 
In suppressing their voices on matters that are currently affecting our 
communities, the NFL is essentially depriving the players of using their fame 
for good. While the protesting may be controversial to some, it is nevertheless 
an expression of speech that should be permissible in any setting. The gravity 
of these issues far outweighs the financial concerns that the NFL may have 
in not allowing this behavior.  
Krynicky may lend some guidance for a claim of state action regarding the 
NFL. While the financial relationship between the government and NFL is 
would not be sufficient to make a finding of a symbiotic relationship.114 The 
interdependent relationship with the state, a relationship where the state is 
115 In order to 
do this, we would need to know the contents of the contract between the 
military and the NFL. Does the contract specify that the NFL must allocate 
the funds in a certain way, like the government required the private 
universities to do in Krynicky?116 Does the military require that the NFL place 
the funds in a certain account, like the state specified in Krynicky?117 Does 
requirement in Krynicky?118 One important criterion is that the NFL does 
enjoy certain tax exemptions from the government, similar to the private 
universities in Krynicky.119 Answers to all these questions are important 
 
military to sponsor patriotic tributes during games). 
113 See Ludtke, 461 F. Supp. at 96. 
114 See Krynicky v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 101 (3d Cir. 1984). 
115 See Burton, 365 U.S. at 725. 
116 See Krynicky, 742 F.2d at 102. 
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the military to a heightened relationship, which could place the NFL in a 
position of constitutional liability.  
The other methods for finding state action within a private organization 
do not seem applicable to the unique scenario confronting the NFL. Under 
the narrowly-applied traditional and exclusive public functions test, the 
military is a traditional and exclusive function of the state, and (2) that the 
state delegated this exclusive function to a private entity, the NFL.120 The 
first element would be very difficult to prove because the military is 
promoted through many different media outlets, including television, radio, 
movies, and music; for example, there are online military newspapers that 
advertise the military,121 and there are even online military memberships that 
help promote the military and advertise on their behalf in order to find jobs 
for veterans.122 The online military newspaper also states at the bottom of the 
home page that it is not a United States government publication.123 Further, 
to make the argument that the government delegated this traditional and 
exclusive function to the NFL is also a difficult scenario to present because 
the government only has a financial relationship with the NFL. And as has 
been stated, a financial relationship alone is not enough to prove state 
action.124 The NFL would have to be performing specific functions that the 
government traditionally performs, such as running elections or operating a 
company town.125 In advertising the United States military, the NFL is not 
performing a traditional and exclusive state function. This also presents a 
distinguishable case from Fabrikant because in that case, the SPCA was 
acting under the delegated authority of New York when it took on the task of 
sterilizing dogs.126 Here, it cannot be said that the government effectively 
127 when all the government 
did was provide compensation in exchange for patriotism; the government 
makes these deals with numerous other organizations.  
In regard to close nexus theory, this, too, likely would fail because the 
government is not affirmatively delegating any authority to the NFL through 
 
120 See Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2000). 
121 MILITARYTIMES, https://www.militarytimes.com/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2020).  
122 See Reach the Large but Elusive Military Market Efficiently, MILITARY.COM, 
https://www.military.com/about-us/advertising-and-sales (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).  
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124 Krynicky v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 101 (3d Cir. 1984). 
125 See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 849 (1982). 
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their relationship. This is crucial because for a close nexus to exist, the 
acts.128 T
Chucadoff, where private doctors were performing medical care according to 
a state-mandated program.129 Since the government is not authorizing the 
NFL to engage in any official capacity, the government is not supporting the 
argument for close nexus theory exists when discussing the coercive power 
and significant encouragement of President Trump. Similar to the Second 
nalysis in Stein, President Trump has relied on his coercive power 
to pressure the NFL into punishing the players for protesting on the field. 
Trump has taken to social media and press events to compel the NFL into 
taking action against the players if the players choose to kneel during the 
National Anthem. His comments have included firing or suspending players 
for kneeling,130 threatening to end tax exemptions for the NFL if they take no 
action on the issue,131 and requesting Vice President Pence to leave an NFL 
game where players kneeled during the National Anthem.132 These coercive 
comments might be enough to force the NFL to adopt certain policies against 
the players. Like the accounting firm in Stein, which felt like it had no choice 
but to adopt the faulty fee policy or go out of business,133 if the NFL believes 
it has no choice but to cooperate with the government or lose its tax benefits 
and reputation, this may be enough to make a claim of state action under the 
close nexus theory.  
Lastly, the argument for entwinement remains a rather weak one as well. 
While the theory of entwinement has been the most recent test developed by 
the Court, the criteria for it is not particularly prominent in the relationship 
between the NFL and the United States military and President Trump. 
private entity itself, not its conduct.134 In Brentwood Academy, the TSSAA 
operated and functioned as a public entity in its regulation of interscholastic 
sports between private and public schools.135 While it changed its identity 
 
128 See WASSERMAN, supra note 13, at 30. 
129 See Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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from a public to private organization, it still maintained the same operations 
as it previously had engaged in.136 The Court applied entwinement to 
ase, there does not seem to be 
any similar entity to the TSSAA, which blurs the distinction between private 
and public and would allow the Court to make a finding of entwinement. Nor 
does there seem to be a situation such as the one presented in Thompson, 
where a public bus company delegated its power to appoint bus drivers to a 
private bus company.137 Had the United States government been the main 
entity in charge of promoting the military and then delegated this function to 
the NFL and other sports organizations, then an argument regarding 
entwinement might be more plausible. However, once again, the relationship 
between the NFL and United States government appears to be more of a 
financial one, and this by itself cannot sustain a finding of state action.  
II.  EMPLOYEE COMPELLED SPEECH  
138 
where any idea, good or bad, can flow freely without any government 
the government cannot force an individual or group to support certain 
139 The compelled speech doctrine expands the limitations placed 
on government because it goes further than restraining the government from 
prohibiting certain speech; the doctrine additionally states that the 
government cannot reprimand anyone for choosing not to support a particular 
view.140  
But how does this doctrine play out in an employment context? Do 
employees receive these same protections? Generally, private employers are 
free to create restrictions they wish to impose on their employees. Because 
the First Amendment is a safeguard against government intrusion, private 
employers are typically shielded from its reach. However, employees of the 
public sector have more narrowed rights when it comes to free speech 
because their employer is the government.141 While they do have protected 
rights, these rights are more conscripted. The landmark Supreme Court case 
 
136 Id. at 301.  
137 See Thompson v. Davidson Transit Org., 563 F. Supp. 2d 820, 827 (M.D. Tenn. 2008). 
138 SAMUEL ESTREICHER, MICHAEL C. HARPER & ELIZABETH C. TIPPETT, CASES AND 
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outlining compelled speech is Barnette, where the Court held that the School 
flag during the Pledge of Allegiance.142 The Court stated that the children 
chose not to salute the flag for religious reasons, which is undeniably 
protected under the First Amendment.143 For the School Board to expel these 
children for exercising their First Amendment rights was a clear violation of 
Section 1983 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments.144 In the most 
quoted phrase of the Barnette 
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or 
145 While Barnette established the dangers of 
compelled speech, it seems heavily applicable to speech in an employment 
setting. Several cases later have seemed to uphold this belief in the 
employment context, holding that the government cannot force a public 
146 
A.  Compelled Speech Cases in the Employment Context 
Barnette seemed to lay the groundwork for compelled speech, but the 
Court did not really apply this doctrine to the employment setting until the 
1950s and 1960s.147 The world encompassing employee speech changed in 
Pickering v. Board of 
Education.148 This case involved a public-school teacher who was dismissed 
from his job for criticizing the Board of Education in how it handled 
proposals for raising revenue within the school district.149 The teacher sent a 
letter to a newspaper condemning the way the Board allocated funds among 
the educational and athletic programs. Once the Board saw the article, it fired 
the teacher.150 The teacher sued the Board, claiming a violation of his First 
Amendment right to free speech, but this was rejected by the lower courts.151 
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On appeal, the Supreme Cou
ultimately held that it was.152 Because the teacher was speaking out about an 
issue that affected members of the community, it was essential to afford his 
speech protection.153  the 
154 
Pickering established the groundwork for protecting employee speech by 
providing a balancing test. The solution is to balance the interests of the 
teacher, as a citizen, speaking out on matters of public concern, with the 
romoting the efficiency of its services.155  
The Court further elaborated on the employee speech balancing test in 
Connick v. Meyers in 1983.156 The plaintiff in Connick was an Assistant 
District Attorney who was terminated for distributing a questionnaire around 
the office, which caused chaos among the staff.157 She claimed that her 
termination violated the First Amendment, so the Court applied the Pickering 
balancing test to determine if so.158 
speech was on a matter of public concern, the Court stated that this must be 
159 Based 
on these criteria, the Court noted that the 
as also relevant.160  
The last important case to build on the Pickering balancing test was 
Garcetti v. Ceballos in 2006.161 In Garcetti, the plaintiff was a deputy district 
attorney who found serious misrepresentations in an affidavit being used to 
obtain a search warrant.162 He told his supervisor about the inaccuracies, but 
the supervisor decided to proceed with the prosecution.163 At trial, the 
plaintiff was called by the defense to testify about the affidavit, and then he 
was later subject to retaliatory employment actions for which he sued.164 The 
 
152 Id. at 572.  
153 Id.  
154 Id. at 571.  
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158 Id. at 143.  
159 Id. at 147 48.  
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official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
165 Because the plaintiff spoke on matters pursuant to 
his duty of being a deputy, he was not afforded First Amendment 
protection.166  
Building on employee speech are the cases that address the 
unconstitutional nature of loyalty oaths. Wieman v. Updegraff involved state 
employees who declined to take an oath required by the state of Oregon that 
said the employee was not and had not been a member of any communist 
organization.167 The employer brought suit, attempting to withhold the state 
168 The state employees 
argued primarily that this oath violated their Due Process rights in attempting 
to bar them from employment on the basis of mere membership in an 
organization.169 There was testimony that the state employees were unaware 
of the intentions of the party they had affiliated with.170 The Court highlighted 
this distinction between innocent and knowing association and declared the 
loyalty oath unconstitutional on Due Process grounds.171 The Court 
172 
Constitutional protection extends to public employees who have been 
excluded due to facially discriminatory or arbitrary laws.173 More than a 
decade later, the Court decided Elfbrandt v. Russell, where it struck down an 
Arizona act as unconstitutional for requiring state employees to take an 
oath.174 The oath read that state employees would not be members of 
organizations having a purpose of overthrowing the government.175 The 
Court found this oath troublesome due to its vagueness because it restricted 
membership in parties that followed both legal and illegal means and created 
unlawful beliefs.176 
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members would be penalized just for being a member of the organization.177 
The Court ultimately found that the oath unnecessarily infringed on protected 
,
doctrine this nation supports.178  
recognized and began to apply the doctrine of compelled speech to situations 
affecting everyday life. The Supreme Court took an interesting turn in 1995 
when it placed the rights of a private parade organizer over the rights of 
LGBTQ parade marchers in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & 
Bisexual Group of Boston.179 This case prompted a rather interesting question 
dealing with private entities: Can the government compel private 
org 180 If so, the government 
might be able to require the NFL players to stand during the National Anthem 
as a sign of respect. This seems to be a rather novel concept, as all the cases 
focusing on this very question have been decided within the past fifteen 
years.  
The first case to touch on this issue was Rumsfeld v. Forum for 
Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. in 2006.181 In Rumsfeld, an amendment 
stated that if an institution for higher education denied access to military 
recruiters, the institution would lose federal funding.182 Certain law schools 
wanted to prohibit military recruiters because many of them did not support 
a congressional policy related to homosexuals in the military.183 The law 
schools filed suit against the Department of Defense arguing that the 
association.184 In arriving at a decision, the Court once again relied on 
Barnette and its establishment of the compelled speech doctrine, as the Court 
reiterated that the First Amendment also prohibits the government from 
telling people what they have to say.185 The Court ultimately held that no 
compelled speech issue persisted in this case dealing with a federal law 
requiring law schools to give military recruiters the same access as other 
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recruiters.186 The Court came to this conclusion because it argued that the 
amendment did not force the law schools to say anything or say something 
specific.187  
In 2018, the Supreme Court came out with two more decisions related 
to compelled speech. The second case the Court decided in 2018 was Janus 
v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 
31. This case involved an Illinois law that ultimately forced employees to 
unionize.188 The law specifically held that if the majority of employees voted 
to be unionized, the union was the sole representative of all the employees, 
even those that did not vote for a union.189 In addition, the nonmembers also 
had to pay part of the union dues, which were set by the union itself.190 Janus, 
a state employee, decided not to join his union; however, because the 
majority of employees chose to unionize, Janus was required to pay dues.191 
He filed suit claiming that the process was unconstitutional for compelling 
individuals to support ideas that they did not agree with, therefore violating 
the First Amendment.192 The Court agreed with Janus and found that this was 
a form of compelled speech since Janus did not consent to paying the dues.193 
194 ition, 
195 
An interesting idea to note is how some courts have reacted to speech 
made by fans in a public sports stadium. This is more of a recent 
development, but it may provide some insight as to how courts will view the 
sports setting, 
fan speech contains similar complexities to employee speech, but overall fans 
are typically permitted to engage in free speech in publicly owned 
stadiums.196 The Supreme Court in Cohen v. California held that the 
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he was charged with disturbing the peace.197 This holding in Cohen extends 
to fans with similar displays of profane messages regarding opposing sports 
teams and players.  
B.  Compelled Speech in the NFL 
The NFL brings a rather interesting conversation to the application of 
compelled speech. While the NFL is a private organization, it is not directly 
subject to the First and Fourteenth Amendments. However, as we have 
previously seen, there are a few circumstances when a private actor may still 
be held accountable as a state actor under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Assuming the symbiotic test or another test is applicable to the 
NFL and the National Anthem controversy, the gates would be open to 
subjecting the NFL to violations of the First Amendment through compelled 
speech.  
In analyzing the relationship between the NFL and its players, we begin 
with the application of the Pickering balance test. The key is to balance the 
interests of the NFL as the employer in promoting an efficient organization 
against the interests of the players, the employees, on speaking about matters 
of public concern.198 
control over the organization are compelling because of the controversial 
nature surrounding the National Anthem issue. The tension surrounding the 
issue creates even more pressure for the NFL to take control and preserve 
compelling, as they are ultimately addressing matters of public concern
police brutality amongst ethnic minorities. Just as the school teacher in 
Pickering was speaking out about school funding, an issue important to the 
community,199 so too are the players speaking out about issues affecting their 
200 In 
Connick also support the 
players in their interests.201 The c
that affect them and others in the community. The form of their speech is 
done through kneeling during the National Anthem. This is not disruptive to 
uring the entire 
important. 
This protesting is not attempting to draw attention to a minor issue in which 
 
197 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).  
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many people are not familiar with. The players are addressing concerns 
within their own communities, affecting their own friends, families, and co-
workers. The concern of police brutality against minorities has become such 
a heated political debate, so much so that people cannot even seem to discuss 
the matter peacefully. As a result, the players have relied on their status to 
raise awareness.  
Because the players are employees of the NFL, we must also apply 
Garcetti 
pursuant to their official duties of being professional athletes.202 If this is so, 
the players are not afforded First Amendment protection because the NFL 
maintains its power to control the duties of its employees. However, the 
players do not seem to be protesting anything remotely tied to their official 
duties as football players. As a professional athlete, they are likely expected 
to show up to practices, follow a rigid diet, attend press events, and perform 
well during games amongst other duties. Protesting social injustices do not 
appear to be a duty expected of the players in being professional athletes. 
Amendment. Moreover, in preventing the players from protesting and forcing 
l[ing] the flow of 
oath upon the players.203 As Wieman and Elfbrandt held, loyalty oaths are 
disfavored in public employment and cannot be used to penalize employees 
for merely exercising their freedom of speech.204 However, the loyalty oath 
cases only apply to public employees.  
Recently, the courts have attempted to address whether the government 
205 The 
courts tend to look for a clear sign that the government is forcing an 
organization to support its ideas. Because of this narrow finding, the National 
Anthem controversy presents a similar outcome to the one reached in 
Rumsfeld. The government is not particularly forcing the players to say 
anything or say something specific.206 President Trump criticized the players 
for kneeling, but he never stated that the players had to say certain comments 
about the flag or the United States. As a result, there does not seem to be a 
compelled speech issue with the players in the NFL. Under the Janus 
framework, the results might vary. Similar to the state employee forced to 
pay union dues in Janus, the NFL (if found as acting under the color of law) 
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cannot compel its players to stand during the National Anthem if the players 
decide not to support those views. Forcing free and independent individuals 
to endorse ideas they find objectionable raises serious First Amendment 
207  
To close off the employee compelled speech section, it will be 
interesting to see how the courts will decide issues dealing with sports 
organizations in the future. Will they apply a similar analysis to the one used 
when fans express themselves in stadiums? Or will they take a different route 
and apply a more restricted test? The inquiry becomes more complex when 
looking at private organizations, such as the NFL, especially when collective 
actions and finding exceptions to the agreement are very difficult to do.  
III.  THE NEXT ROUND OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: WHAT TO 
EXPECT 
As we have seen, the NFL National Anthem controversy contains 
several legal issues in need of resolution before the next round of collective 
bargaining 
media have not been enough to hint at what could be expected, one can 
assume that discussions will most definitely intensify the closer we get to 
2021. Several players have also spoken out about a potential lockout once the 
current 10-year collective bargaining agreement expires in 2021.208 The 
all the drama and chaos surrounding the National Anthem issue, it comes as 
no surprise that the players will be looking for more protected rights under 
the next CBA. This lockout could last as long as, if not longer than, the 
previous lockout in 2011. The 2011 lockout occurred over the course of four 
months but did not interfere with any pre-season or regular season games.209 
Some believe this lockout could have lasted longer if the players had prepared 
better for it.210 As a result, the players seem ready to negotiate during this 
next round, meaning a long and arduous battle looms ahead. As tensions 
continue to run high, the players will likely fight harder and longer to secure 
more rights and protections under the CBA.  
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Another probable change that is expected to come out of the 2021 
collective bargaining process is a new rule regarding the National Anthem. 
NFL game, and all players must be on the sideline for the National 
211 Further, the policy mentions that players should stand, but there 
is no explicit requirement that players must stand.212 In negotiations 
preceding the new 2021 CBA, the NFL likely will seek to include a modified 
provis
game, and all players who are on the field must stand for the National 
213 The players will likely be upset with this proposition and they 
will struggle to negotiate this rule. While the players strongly oppose this 
rule, the team owners will want a strict policy regarding these protests.214 The 
players  possible arguments include that this change could impact their 
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. Players would argue that 
although the policy change might not directly punish players, it nevertheless 
adversely affects the employment of players who protest in violation of the 
new policy.215 
proposed rule could be challenged under federal antitrust laws.216 Because it 
collectively bargained for, the players would have standing to challenge it.217 
This is in direct opposition to Kaepernick
the NFL after he alleged that the teams in the league conspired to prohibit 
him from playing on any team due to his initiation of the protests during the 
National Anthem. While these are just some of the plausible arguments that 
both sides might make, we will have to wait and see exactly what arguments 
each side brings to the table in 2021. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
In 2016, quarterback Colin Kaepernick caused a national uproar when 
he decided to kneel during the National Anthem of an NFL pre-season game. 
On one hand, people praised him for bringing attention to a controversial 
issue police brutality against minorities. On the other hand, people 
criticized him for disrespecting the flag, the country, and all the men and 
women in the military who fight every day for our freedom. The NFL sought 
a way to stop Kaepernick from engaging in this contentious behavior, but 
legal issues began to surround the league and the players. Some have 
attempted to argue that the First Amendment is applicable to the NFL, a 
private organization. The arguments related to this theory are discussed in 
this paper. To hold the NFL liable for violating the First Amendment in 
State action can be found in private organizations as well, through several 
tests such as traditional and exclusive public functions, symbiotic 
relationship, close nexus, or entwinement. In addition, the role of the United 
States military and the President and Vice President might help create state 
action within the NFL. After state action is proven, employee compelled 
speech and how it applies to the private setting of the NFL must also be 
addressed. Lastly, there are some key arguments likely to be negotiated by 
both sides during the next round of collective bargaining in 2021. The next 
couple of years in the NFL will certainly be exciting and challenging, as both 
 
to control its operations. 
 
